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Premier of the state. Again, it is not the Foreign Office but the Common-
wealth Relations Office that deals with the Commonwealth government on
matters concerning the federation as a whole.35 The chronology of the Seces-
sion movement in the United States on the eve of the Civil War has got
curiously tangled up.36 The decision of the United Kingdom Parliamentary
Select Committee not to receive Western Australia's petition to secede did
did not so much deny "the right of secession in either Canada or Australia" as
make it plain that it could not be done by one state or province acting on
its own.37 It is true that there is no document explicitly recognizing the right
of a member of the Commonwealth to secede from it; but there are a number
of authoritative statements which make that right absolutely clear, at least
since 1949. Similarly, although no right of withdrawal is included in the
United Nations Charter, the San Francisco Conference adopted a "Declara-
tion of Withdrawal" which put the right effectively on record.
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RABBI Rackman, a member of the Faculty of Political Science at Yeshiva
University, has written a very timely study of the difficulties that faced the
political leaders of the new State of Israel in the task of drafting and adopting
a written constitution. It should prove of great interest and value not only to
specialists in Jewish history and culture but also to those students of the broad
subject of comparative constitutional law who are concerned with the practical
problem of implementing democratic principles and forms of government in
newly independent and self-governing countries.
One special feature of constitution-making in the new State of Israel. in com-
parison to similar experiments in, say, Ireland, India, or Pakistan,' is the avail-
ability of an extraordinarily broad and varied body of jurisprudential experi-
ence-a consequence of the immigration during the postwar years of vast num-
bers of refugees and displaced persons from most of the European countries
and even from Asia and Africa. It is indicative of the high quality of technical
skill and the wide range of legal backgrounds available to the Israeli govern-
ment that the first draft of a constitution was the work of a former German
constitutional lawyer, Dr. Leo Kohn, who years before had assisted in similar
work for the government of Ireland, then newly independent from the United
Kingdom and looking around, in the inevitable reaction against all things Eng-
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lish, for Continental European models for their new constitution. Dr. Kohn
had gone on to write the leading text on Irish constitutional law; and finally,
as a distinguished civil servant in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, was called on
to prepare a constitution for consideration by the Constituent Assembly of
Israel.
The task, in comparison with that in Ireland, proved a difficult one. The
Irish constitution-makers were agreed from the outset on the key concepts of
their society: it was to be a Roman Catholic state, in which Roman Catholic
ideals would be used to resolve the essential problems of the Church, the family,
education and private property; thus the problems of drafting were purely
mechanical ones. In contrast, although the State of Israel certainly had as its
historical raison d'etre the Jewish religion, there was sharp disagreement in
the Constituent Assembly as to whether the new State should be religious or
secular in nature ;2 and whether indeed, there should be a constitution at all.
And even had there been agreement in principle on a constitution embodying
religious ideals, there was still considerable room for argument as to precisely
what that involved.
Generally speaking, it was the orthodox religious leaders in the Constituent
Assembly who questioned the desirability of the whole constitutional project.
They suggested that Israel's Torah was her constitution, pointing out that the
Torah provided not only doctrines for man's spiritual guidance, but directives
for every aspect of his individual and social existence as well. These religiously
derived objections were bolstered by pragmatic arguments that reflected the
European background of the Israeli political leaders. As one of them said (re-
calling Savigny's successful fight to delay Thibaut's proposals in 1814 for codi-
fication of the laws of Germany) : "Alas, our generation is not equal to such a
lofty view." 3 And legal arguments with an English flavor were used to refute
the contention that the constitution must fix all details in accordance with the
patterns of other states, it being urged instead that a constitution need only
enunciate general principles, leaving it to the nation to develop, by subsequent
trial and error, her own particular parliamentary methods and institutions.4
Views such as these were widely held, and given more weight by the support
of the strongest postwar Israeli leader and first Prime Minister of the new
State, David Ben-Gurion, who originally favored a written constitution and
then changed his mind. The upshot was that Dr. Kohn's draft was shelved and
the constitutional project substantially dropped, although technically the reso-
lution of the constitutional issue was that in principle a constitution should be
adopted but not at the present time, and certainly not in the form of an im-
mediate comprehensive enactment. For the time being, a number of funda-
mental or basic laws could be adopted and put into operation seriatim, and
eventually they could be consolidated into a written constitution.
In fact, a number of basic laws have been enacted, relating to such subjects
2. The Israeli experience recalls the controversies in this regard in the Constituent
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as the election and functions of the President, the appointment and resignation
of ministers, the mode of parliamentary elections, the rights and immunities of
members of the legislature, the establishment of the defense services, the or-
ganization of the law courts and appointment of judges, and similar matters.
These laws, supplemented by the "Jewish legal and ethical tradition," may be
regarded, in the absence of a formal, written constitution, as Israel's "oral
constitution." 5
This oral constitution is, in effect, not too different from the parliamentary
constitutions of Western Europe. Effective power is concentrated in the Kneset,
a single-chamber legislature which provides the personnel of the government,
elects the President of the State, enacts laws, fixes the national budget, imposes
taxes, and passes votes of confidence and censure on the government.
One noticeable feature of the resultant system of government is the absence
of express limitations in the form of a Bill of Rights or similar guarantees
against the legislative power. The Constituent Assembly, or more specifically
its Committee on the Constitution, which considered Dr. Kohn's draft and other
proposals, included many who wanted to enact provisions of this nature. But
since, quite apart from the dispute over the issue of a religious versus a secular
state, every shade of opinion was represented on the Committee-ranging, in
terms of political and economic philosophy, from liberal capitalism through
Fabian socialism to Marxist communism-no sufficient consensus could ever be
arrived at as to the content of the guarantees to be included in the proposed
constitution. The common factor that did link them all, Judaism, failed to pro-
vide a concrete political philosophy or system of political ideas that would dic-
tate the contents of such a Bill of Rights.
The reasons for this lack of political signposts in the tenets of Judaism, as
outlined by Rabbi Rackman,6 make interesting reading. First, there is in fact
no definitive political philosophy in Judaism: both secularists and religionists
among the leaders of the first Kneset could thus have used biblical and tal-
mudic materials to sustain their opposing points of view. Again, the rabbinical
seminaries of Palestine taught and developed talmudic learning for centuries
with such obliviousness to Western political thought that the concepts of sov-
ereignty, authority, power, constitutional limitations and mixed government
were never related to the source materials of Judaism. Finally, when in very
recent years there developed a decided trend toward applying talmudic sources
to the theoretical foundations and practical institutions of a modern state, the
emphasis was on civil and criminal jurisprudence rather than on public law. 7
So much so, indeed, that when Dr. Kohn provided in his draft constitution for
the institution of judicial review, he indicated the notion was inspired by
American practice and did not refer at all to the much older talmudic source.
Rabbi Rackman is particularly severe in his criticisms of the party leaders
in Israel for their failure to adopt a written constitution, charging them, in
effect, with playing at party politics in the Constituent Assembly and ignoring
5. P. 114.
6. Pp. 48-49.
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long range constitutional questions in favor of partisan bickering. But the
differences of opinion also reflected the wide diversity of background, outlook
and experience of the present-day population of Israel. The Mapai (Palestine
Labor Party) which generally favors a secular state, was the largest political
party in the first Kneset, and yet it did not have a clear majority and so was
forced to make a coalition with the religious parties. The abandonment by Mr.
Ben-Gurion, its leader, of his original support of a written constitution, may
have been dictated by the exigencies of practical politics. On the other hand,
the Mapam (United Labor Party), small in numbers but strong in ideas since
it draws its strength from the collective agricultural settlements, the urban
workers and the intelligentsia, has been militantly anti-religious throughout.
It has favored the written constitution and has also bitterly attacked the Mapai
coalition with the religious bloc, which it complains has had the result of delay-
ing a necessary and inevitable Kulturkampf by the government against the
Church.
Just as the socialist parties have been split by the religious question, so the
religious bloc has frequently been divided by non-religious, economic issues.
The principal religious party, the General Zionists, is cloven into two groups
tending to line up according to social and economic class affiliations. The
dominant group largely represents the industrialists, merchants, citrus fruit
growers and landlords, and is understandably strongly right-wing in economic
outlook. The rival group, which eventually broke away to form the separate
Progressive Party, believes in state control of the economy and draws its
strength from middle and, even more, lower middle class elements, and in ad-
dition from the new immigrants from Central Europe who could not break
into the older political parties where the membership was overwhelmingly
Eastern European in origin.
The plan finally worked out in the Israeli Constituent Assembly of adopting
only a skeletal constitution-the basic laws which were subsequently adopted
seriatim-seems, in the light of the differences dividing the political leaders,
a pragmatically sound solution to the problem of agreeing on a constitutional
instrument. The minimum machinery of government is there and can be supple-
mented in the future as agreement is reached. One wonders if some such
similar expedient might not, in the case of the newly independent countries
of Southeast Asia, have provided a convenient method of transition to self-
government-a method that would have avoided the extremes of overly in-
clusive drafting (vide the cumbersome, all-foreseeing Indian Republican con-
stitution, a product of three years of deliberation from 1946 to 1949), or simple
stalemate (the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, finally dissolved in late 1954
by Executive decree, had deliberated for eight years without reaching agree-
ment).
Although the constitutional compromise promises to be workable, Rabbi
Rackman is clearly correct in adverting to the dangers of the atomising of
power represented by the multi-party system that has developed in the Kneset,
preventing any party from getting an effective majority. Insofar as this means
that no assuredly stable government can be formed, it seems to open up for
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Israel all the risks of a weak executive that have so plagued France under
the Third and Fourth Republics. This will be a severe handicap for a country
facing the internal and external problems that confront Israel today. Even with
problems such as reform of the electoral laws (at present based on the Con-
tinental proportional representation system), it is probably overly optimistic
to hope for much improvement at the present time, in view of the fierce doc-
trinal issues dividing the parties.
There are, as we have noted, no express limitations on the law-making
powers of the Kneset, nor is there any provision for judicial review, for no
action has been taken, or even foreshadowed, on Dr. Kohn's proposal to this
effect. Nevertheless, there is still some limited opportunity for court interven-
tion, just as in England, in the process of scrutinizing Executive application
or purported application of laws enacted by the ITneset.8 If the courts have not
yet had much to do with public law, however, they have been able to draw
freely on the bodies of private law developed in other countries. The English
common law was introduced into Palestine after World War I, as a result of
the British mandate. One of the important consequences of this association
with English law, amplified by the fact that the Supreme Court of Palestine
consisted mainly of English judges, was the introduction of the English doc-
trine of precedent and the principle of stare decisis, although even under the
British mandate the majority of lawyers practising in Palestine had been trained
in the law schools of Continental European countries where these English doc-
trines were unknown, and they had always, in consequence, been reluctant to
follow them.9 Since the establishment of the State of Israel there has been a
definite trend towards citing and relying on American precedents, and Ameri-
can decisions are now preferred to English ones whenever the court thinks
them better suited to local conditions.' 0
The new Supreme Court of Israel which took the place of the old Palestine
Supreme Court six years ago is broadly varied in background. Of the nine
justices on the Court today, two were born in Israel and the others came from
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Danzig, Poland, Lithuania
and Russia. As to education, two were trained in law in the United States,
four in the United Kingdom and three in Germany." Although, as we have
already noted in connection with the Constituent Assembly, there may still be
difficulties in arriving at a formal definition of the key philosophic concepts of
the new State of Israel, we may be sure, in the light of this highly rich and
varied judicial background, that the Israel Supreme Court will soon develop a
jurisprudence distinguished for its intellectual breadth and eclecticism.
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